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Court. 6
Carole F. Barrett
Recent developments in the expanding right to counsel
During the past several years, the Bar has witnessed signifi-
cant activity by the Court of Appeals in its continuing effort to
evolve an acceptable right to counsel standard. The Court's often
expressed belief that the criminal defendant is at a great disadvan-
tage when confronted with the "coercive police power of the
state '97 has served as the primary impetus for the Court to afford
considerable protection to a defendant in custody. In order to
strike a balance between the competing interests of effective law
enforcement on the one hand and preserving the rights of the
criminally accused on the other, one solution offered by the Court
" Although the Torsney Court's equal protection analysis appears sound, its liberal
construction of CPL § 330.20 raises questions as to the protection afforded society by the
resultant "judicial amendment." Indeed, the Court itself acknowledged the dichotomy that
may now exist between the subjective, nonuniform concept of mental illness that justifies
acquittal and the objective criteria mandated by due process to justify continued confine-
ment. 47 N.Y.2d at 683, 394 N.E.2d at 271, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 202. Judge Jasen suggested that
the solution to this "friction" might lie with legislative reevaluation of the insanity defense
itself. Id. The Department of Mental Hygiene has recommended that the insanity defense
be abolished and replaced by a plea of "diminished capacity under which evidence of abnor-
mal mental condition would be admissible to affect the degree of crime for which the ac-
cused could be convicted." New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, A Report to
Governor Hugh L. Carey on the Insanity Defense in New York 9 (1978). See also
Steadman, Insanity Acquittals in New York State, 1965-1978, 137 Am. J. PsycH. 321 (1980).
It also has been suggested that the insanity defense be modified to "guilty, but insane," to
allow for retention and treatment within the criminal justice system itself. See R. PERKINS,
CRIMINAL LAW 883 (2d ed. 1969); Note, Insanity-Guilty But Mentally Ill-Diminished
Capacity: An Aggregate Approach to Madness, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PRoc. 351 (1979).
Alternatively, it is suggested that a statute requiring testimony on present sanity and spe-
cific jury determination on that issue should be adopted. Upon a finding of acquittal with
continued insanity, the defendant would then be automatically committed for treatment.
See Note, Commitment-Standard for Commitment Following Acquittal by Reason of In-
sanity made Uniform with that for Civil Commitment-State v. Krol, 7 SETON HAUL L.
REv. 412 (1976). While discussion of the possible statutory amendment of Penal Law §
30.05, see note 61 supra, is beyond the scope of this article, it is submitted that legislative
review of CPL § 330.20 should include review of Penal Law § 30.05, in order to ensure that
any proposed statutory scheme protects both the constitutional requisites of due process,
equal protection, and the general societal interests of the State.
07 People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 485, 348 N.E.2d 894, 898, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 423
(1976); see People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 160, 385 N.E.2d 612, 614, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 877
(1978).
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was to "breathe life" into a defendant's right to counsel by permit-
ting its waiver only in the presence of a lawyer.98 This "indelible"
right to counsel rule was first applied only in cases where an attor-
ney actually had entered the proceeding-commonly known as the
Donovan-Arthur rule.99 The inequity of affording the represented
defendant substantially greater protection than the unrepresented
defendant, however, led the Court to declare that the commence-
ment of "formal judicial proceedings. . . by indictment or arraign-
ment" also triggers the indelible right to counsel.100
98 People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 484, 348 N.E.2d 894, 898, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 422,
(1976); see People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 160, 385 N.E.2d 612, 614-15, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874,
877 (1978).
99 The Donovan-Arthur rule is the product of several Court of Appeals decisions. In
People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963), the court sup-
pressed the statements of a criminal defendant that were made after the police had denied
his attorney access to him. Id. at 151, 193 N.E.2d at 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 843. The Court
declared that it was illegal for the police to interrogate a defendant after he, his lawyer, or
his family had sought permission from the police to speak together. Id. at 153, 193 N.E.2d at
630, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 844. The Court later made it clear that the defendant need not actually
be denied access to counsel or explicitly request counsel for the mandates of Donovan to
apply. People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1965); People v.
Friedlander, 16 N.Y.2d 248, 212 N.E.2d 553, 265 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1965). In People v. Arthur, 22
N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968), the Court indicated that the moment
the police become aware that the defendant has retained or been assigned counsel, or once a
lawyer informs the police that he is representing the defendant, the right to counsel at-
taches. Id. at 329, 239 N.E.2d at 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 666. Moreover, the Court held that an
effective waiver of the right can be made only in the presence of the defendant's attorney.
Id.
Although the validity of the Donovan-Arthur rule later became the subject of doubt,
see People v. Lopez, 28 N.Y.2d 23, 268 N.E.2d 628, 319 N.Y.S.2d 825, cert. denied, 404 U.S.
840 (1971); People v. Robles, 27 N.Y.2d 155, 263 N.E.2d 304, 314 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 945 (1971), the rule was forcefully endorsed by the Court in People v.
Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 485-86, 348 N.E.2d 894, 899, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 423-24 (1976), dis-
cussed in The Survey, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 201, 218 (1976). The Hobson Court, however,
noted three situations in which the Donovan-Arthur right would not attach: when the de-
fendant was not in custody, when the statement was "spontaneously volunteered," and
when the defendant was represented by counsel in an unrelated proceeding. 39 N.Y.2d at
483, 348, N.E.2d at 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 422. But see notes 145-179 and accompanying text
infra. For further discussion of the Donovan-Arthur line of cases, see The Survey, 53 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 803, 856 n.259 (1979); The Survey, 52 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 485, 512 n.130
(1978); 1978 Survey of New York Law, 30 SYRACUSE L. REv. 15, 121 (1979).
100 People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 166, 385 N.E.2d 612, 618, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 881
(1978). Just as the Donovan-Arthur protection of represented defendants evolved through a
series of cases, see note 99 supra, so did the general right to counsel that applied to all
defendants, based upon the stage of the criminal proceeding. People v. Bodie, 16 N.Y.2d
275, 213 N.E.2d 441, 266 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1965); People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d
103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962); People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216
N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961); People v. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21
(1960). In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), the Supreme Court declared that the right
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Recently the Court addressed three additional issues: whether
a request for counsel triggers the indelible right; whether the filing
of other accusatory instruments may give rise to the indelible
right; and finally, whether the indelible right extends to an unre-
lated charge.
People v. Cunningham:0 1 Request for counsel triggers indelible
right
The defendant in Cunningham was charged with murder in
the second degree for his alleged participation in the shooting of a
to counsel attaches upon "the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings. . . by. . . formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment." Id. at 689. Subse-
quently, the Court of Appeals ruled that a defendant has a right to the assistance of an
attorney once an accusatory instrument has been filed. People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 339-
40, 320 N.E.2d 625, 631-32, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881, 890-91 (1974). In other words, the filing of an
accusatory instrument, see CPL § 1.20(1) (Supp. 1979-1980) marks the commencement of
the "critical stage" of the prosecution, during which all defendants enjoy the right to coun-
sel. See People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d at 165, 385 N.E.2d at 618, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 881; People
v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d at 339-40, 320 N.E.2d at 631-32, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 890-91. The Court has
held, however, that in addition to the filing of an accusatory instrument, a court order of
removal also is "sufficiently 'judicial' in nature" to trigger the right to counsel. People v.
Coleman, 43 N.Y.2d 222, 225-26, 371 N.E.2d 819, 821, 401 N.Y.S.2d 57, 59-60 (1977); People
v. Sugden, 35 N.Y.2d 453, 461, 323 N.E.2d 169, 174, 363 N.Y.S.2d 923, 929 (1974).
Whether the "critical stage" right to counsel was also "indelible" was more problemati-
cal. In People v. Lopez, 28 N.Y.2d 23, 268 N.E.2d 628, 319 N.Y.S.2d 825, cert. denied, 404
U.S. 840 (1971), the Court held that an unrepresented defendant in a post-indictment set-
ting could waive his right to counsel in the absence of a lawyer. Id. at 25-26, 268 N.E.2d at
628-29, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 826-27. Lopez was overruled in People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479,
485-90, 348 N.E.2d 894, 899-902, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 423-27 (1976); see People v. Settles, 46
N.Y.2d at 162, 385 N.E.2d at 615, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 878. Although it was unnecessary to
overrule Lopez since Hobson was a represented defendant against whom no accusatory in-
strument had been filed, see 39 N.Y.2d at 482, 348 N.E.2d at 896, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 421, in so
doing, the Hobson Court seemed to indicate that both represented and unrepresented de-
fendants during a critical stage could waive the right to counsel only in the presence of an
attorney. The Survey, 51 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 201, 220; see 39 N.Y.2d at 493, 348 N.E.2d at
904, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 428 (Gabriefli, J., concurring). Confusion was caused, however, by the
Court's subsequent decision in People v. Coleman, 43 N.Y.2d 222, 371 N.E.2d 819, 401
N.Y.S.2d 57 (1977). In Coleman, the Court held that although an unrepresented defendant's
right to counsel had been triggered by a court order of removal issued prior to the filing of
an accusatory instrument, 43 N.Y.2d at 225-26, 371 N.E.2d at 821, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 59-60,
the right could be waived without the assistance of a lawyer. Id. at 226-27, 371 N.E.2d at
821, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 59-60. For an examination of Coleman see The Survey, 52 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 485, 505 (1978). The Court clarified its position somewhat in People v. Settles, 46
N.Y.2d 154, 385 N.E.2d 616, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978), when it ruled that upon the return of
an indictment or at arraignment, there attaches an indelible right to counsel that is waivable
only in the preseice of an attorney. Id. at 166, 385 N.E.2d at 618, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 881. For a
discussion of the Settles case, see The Survey, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 804, 856 (1979).
1o1 49 N.Y.2d 203, 400 N.E.2d 360, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1980) (per curiam).
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service station attendant.102 The police arrested the defendant and
administered the requisite Miranda warnings.103 Cunningham in-
voked his constitutional rights, including his right to consult with
an attorney. 104 The police then terminated all interrogation and
placed him in a jail cell.10 5 Several hours later, the defendant in-
formed the police that he wished to make a statement.106 Notwith-
standing his initial willingness to speak, Cunningham reiterated his
request for a lawyer. 107 After conferring with his wife, however, the
defendant agreed to submit to police questioning without the assis-
tance of counsel and thereafter made incriminating statements. 0
The lower court denied the defendant's pre-trial motion to sup-
press the statements, and the Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment, affirmed without opinion. 09
In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals re-
versed. 10 The Court reasoned that since a demand for an attorney
is indicative of a defendant's inability to deal with the police with-
out legal assistance,"' any decision on the part of the defendant to
waive his right to counsel outside the presence of a lawyer could
not be the product of an informed choice. 1 2 Moreover, the Court
0
103 Id. at 205, 400 N.E.2d at 361, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
:03 Id. at 205, 400 N.E.2d at 362, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
104 Id. at 206, 400 N.E.2d at 362, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 423. When the defendant was first
apprehended, he was promptly given Miranda warnings. Although at this juncture he
agreed to speak with the police, he made no incriminating statements. Id. at 205-06, 400
N.E.2d at 362, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 422. Later in the evening the defendant was told that he was
being put under formal arrest and, at that time, was given a second set of Miranda warn-
ings. The defendant then indicated his desire to confer with counsel. Id. at 206, 400 N.E.2d
at 362, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
lo Id. at 206, 400 N.E.2d at 362, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 423. The police informed Cunning-
ham that he would be able to see an attorney "after he had been 'booked' and arraigned."
Id. The police, however, did not attempt to secure an attorney for the defendant prior to his
arraignment. Id.
106 Id.
17 Id. After Cunningham requested to make a statement, he was removed from his cell
and again given Miranda warnings. When asked to sign a written waiver of his constitu-
tional rights, however, the defendant "balked" and renewed his demand for the assistance of
counsel. Id. The police terminated all interrogation and proceeded to return the defendant
to the jail cell. Id.
18 Id. As the defendant was being returned to his jail cell, he spied his wife, who had
been at the station since the defendant's arrest. Id. He was permitted to speak with her
privately. Id.
109 Id. at 205, 400 N.E.2d at 361-62, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 425.
110 49 N.Y.2d at 210, 400 N.E.2d at 365, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 426.
" Id. at 209, 400 N.E.2d at 364, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 425; see Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S.
96, 110 n.2 (White, J., concurring) (1975).
112 49 N.Y.2d at 210, 400 N.E.2d at 365, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 426.
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observed that while the indelible right to counsel attaches for both
represented and unrepresented defendants "upon the commence-
ment of formal adversary proceedings,"11 it protects represented
defendants at all stages of the custodial process.114 To redress this
imbalance between the rights of represented and unrepresented
defendants, the Cunningham Court concluded that once a defen-
dant in custody requests a lawyer, he cannot thereafter waive his
right to counsel except in the presence of an attorney.11
The Cunningham holding was premised upon a desire to avoid
pivoting right to counsel protection on the "fortuitous circum-
stances of the defendant having had an attorney prior to his ar-
rest." Regardless whether the defendant had prevously retained
or been assigned a lawyer, the Court indicated that without the
assistance of an attorney, the defendant's ability to waive counsel
knowingly and voluntarily is doubtful.11 7 It is suggested that a sim-
ilar rationale could be applied with equal force to a defendant who,
rather than requesting a lawyer, waives his right to counsel imme-
diately after his arrest and receipt of Miranda warnings. Since po-
lice encounters often generate confusion and fear, it would appear
that such a waiver is likely to be less considered or informed than
one made by a defendant who was aware of and asserted his right
to have an attorney present.118
11 Id. at 208, 400 N.E.2d at 363, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 424; see note 100 and accompanying
text supra.
114 49 N.Y.2d at 208, 400 N.E.2d at 364, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 424; see note 98 and accompa-
nying text supra.
211 49 N.Y.2d at 210, 400 N.E.2d at 365, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 426. The Cunningham Court
stated that its holding represented a "logical" extension of the right to counsel in New York:
Indeed, it makes little sense to say that a represented defendant in custody can-
not effectively waive his right to counsel in the absence of counsel, while at the
same time holding that an individual who has not yet secured an attorney but who
has nonetheless requested the services of one can subsequently make an informed
and voluntary decision to waive his rights without the advice of a lawyer.
Id. at 209-10, 400 N.E.2d at 364, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 425 (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original).
1-6 Id. at 210, 400 N.E.2d at 364, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 425.
117 Id. at 209-10, 400 N.E.2d at 364, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 425.
118 In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966), the Court noted: "The circum-
stances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of
one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators." Id. Cf. People v. Settles, 46
N.Y.2d 154, 161, 385 N.E.2d 612, 615, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 878 (1978) (attorney's presence
necessary to counter awesome power of the state). It is submitted that Cunningham lends
support to the proposition that a waiver made immediately after the giving of Miranda
warnings is more suspect than a waiver made after the right to counsel has been invoked.
The most significant factor in Cunningham is that upon his initial apprehension, the defen-
1980]
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As a result of the principle it established, the Cunningham de-
cision has dispelled much of the post-Miranda uncertainty con-
cerning the effect of a waiver of counsel following an affirmative
request for counsel.11 While the Court's effort to ameliorate the
dant waived his constitutional rights. 49 N.Y.2d at 205-06, 400 N.E.2d at 362, 424 N.Y.S.2d
at 422. Indeed, it was not until 3 V2 hours after his arrest and after the second administra-
tion of Miranda warnings that Cunningham decided to request the assistance of counsel. Id.
at 206, 400 N.E.2d at 362, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 423. Throughout Cunninghams custody, there
was no evidence that the police had engaged in coercive tactics. Cunningham received Mi-
randa warnings three times during his stay at the police station. Id. at 205-06, 400 N.E.2d at
362, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 422-23. Upon both his requests for counsel, the police "immediately
cut off the questioning." Id. at 206, 400 N.E.2d at 362, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 423. Moreover, it was
only after the police had permitted the defendant to confer with his wife that he decided to
forego his prior requests and submit to interrogation. Id. Nevertheless, the Court, focusing
on tije requests, found the defendant unable to confront the police without the advice of a
lawyer. Id. at 209, 400 N.E.2d at 364, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 425. It is suggested that the same
could be said of the defendant at the time of his initial waiver; it would appear that Cun-
ningham's second waiver was more informed than his first.
"0 In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in addition to establishing the now
traditional constitutional warnings that the police must give every suspect before subjecting
him to a custodial interrogation, id. at 444, the Court also addressed the procedure to be
followed once a defendant invokes his right to counsel, id. at 473-74. The Court stated:
If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease
until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportu-
nity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent
questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he
wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain
silent.
Id. at 474.
The Miranda decision failed to provide adequate guidelines for applying its mandated
procedures. See People v. Grant, 45 N.Y.2d 366, 372, 380 N.E.2d 257, 260, 408 N.Y.S.2d 429,
432 (1978). One of the more difficult areas concerned the ability of the police to resume
interrogating a defendant after he had asserted his constitutional rights. See People v.
Aponte, 69 App. Div. 2d 204, 216 & n.5, 418 N.Y.S.2d 651, 658 & n.5 (2d Dep't 1979). Nine
years later the Supreme Court confronted the right to silence aspect of the issue in Michi-
gan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). Upon being advised of his rights, Mosley refused to sub-
mit to police questioning, invoking his right to silence, but never requested a lawyer. Id. at
97. Subsequently, however, he agreed to speak and made incriminating statements. Id. at
98. Finding the statements admissible, the Court held that when a defendant expresses a
desire not to speak to the police, questioning need not cease indefinitely but can be renewed
if the defendant's request to remain silent is "scrupulously honored" by the police. Id. at
103-04.
Although it was unnecessary for the Mosley Court to consider the admissibility of state-
ments made subsequent to a request for counsel, the Court declared in a footnote that the
Miranda Court had distinguished between the procedural safeguards triggered by a request
to remain silent and a request for an attorney and directed that "the interrogation must
cease until an attorney is present" only "[i]f the individual states that he wants an attor-
ney." Id. at 104 n.10 (citation omitted).
Notwithstanding this statement by the Mosley Court, the New York Court of Appeals
refused to apply a per se rule prohibiting the police from custodially interrogating a suspect
after he had asserted his right to counsel, stating that the issue had not yet been clearly
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coercive atmosphere of custodial detention is laudatory,12 0 it is
hoped that in the future, the Court will consider the important
role police investigation plays in the criminal process. It is submit-
ted that any further expansion of the Cunningham principle would
be unwarranted, since it would disrupt the balance between "the
competing interests of society in the protection of cherished indi-
vidual rights" and the need for "effective ... investigation of
crime.""'2
People v. Samuels:12 2 Indelible right to counsel triggered by filing
of felony complaint
Following the filing of a felony complaint pursuant to which
decided. See People v. Johnson, 48 N.Y.2d 565, 567, 399 N.E.2d 936, 938, 423 N.Y.S.2d 905,
907 (1979); People v. Dean, 47 N.Y.2d 967, 393 N.E.2d 1030, 419 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1979); Peo-
ple v. Clark, 45 N.Y.2d 432, 380 N.E.2d 290, 408 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1978); People v. Munlin, 45
N.Y.2d 427, 380 N.E.2d 288, 408 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1978); People v. Grant, 45 N.Y.2d 366, 380
N.E.2d 257, 408 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1978); People v. Buxton, 44 N.Y.2d 33, 374 N.E.2d 384, 403
N.Y.S.2d 487 (1978). Instead, the Court transplanted and rigorously applied the Mosley
test, inquiring whether the police had "scrupulously honored" the defendant's request for
counsel. E.g., People v. Clark, 45 N.Y.2d 432, 440, 380 N.E.2d 290, 294-95, 408 N.Y.S.2d 463,
468 (1978); see People v. Aponte, 69 App. Div. 2d 204, 216-17, 418 N.Y.S.2d 651, 659 (2d
Dep't 1979). The validity of employing the "scrupulously honored" test was suspect, how-
ever, since Mosley was exclusively a right-to-silence case. It is suggested that under the
guise of the Mosley test, the Court appeared to be edging toward a per se exclusion of
waivers after a request for counsel had been made. See generally People v. Buxton, 44
N.Y.2d 33, 36-37, 374 N.E.2d 384, 386-87, 403 N.Y.S.2d 487, 489 (1978); Kelder, Criminal
Procedure, 1979 Survey of New York Law, 30 SYRACUSE L. REV. 15, 121 (1979).
The Cunningham holding is not unique. Many jurisdictions have also adopted such a
rule. See People v. Grant, 45 N.Y.2d 366, 375 n.1, 380 N.E.2d 257, 262 n.1, 408 N.Y.S.2d
429, 434 n.1 (1978) and cases cited therein. Other courts, however, have refused to hold that
the mere request for counsel precludes further interrogation on the ground that Miranda
does not require a per se approach. See, e.g., United States v. Charlton, 565 F.2d 86 (6th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 (1978); United States v. Womack, 542 F.2d 1047,
1050-51 (9th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel Hines v. LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976); State v. Greene, 91 N.M. 207, 572 P.2d 935
(1977); Nash v. State, 477 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
120 The Cunningham Court stated:
Our special solicitude for this fundamental right [of counsel] is based upon our
belief that the presence of an attorney is the most effective means we have of
minimizing the disadvantage at which an accused is placed when he is directly
confronted with the awesome law enforcement machinery possessed by the State.
49 N.Y.2d at 207, 400 N.E.2d at 363, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 424 (1980) (citing People v. Settles, 46
N.Y.2d 154, 161, 385 N.E.2d 612, 615, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 877 (1978); People v. Hobson, 39
N.Y.2d 479, 485, 348 N.E.2d 894, 898-99, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 423 (1976)).
121 People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 150, 193 N.E.2d 628, 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842
(1963) (quoting People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 564, 175 N.E.2d 445, 447, 216 N.Y.S.2d
70, 73 (1961)).
122 49 N.Y.2d 218, 400 N.E.2d 1344, 424 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1980).
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an arrest warrant was issued, Samuels was apprehended for the
robbery of a store in Nassau County.123 The defendant was then
brought to the police station for processing where he was appraised
of his constitutional rights and, in the absence of counsel, interro-
gated by the police. 124 During the questioning, Samuels made in-
criminating statements.1 25 After his unsuccessful attempt to sup-
press the statements, the defendant was tried and convicted of
robbery in the first degree.128 The Appellate Division, Second De-
partment, affirmed, and the defendant appealed.1 27
The Court of Appeals reversed.'28 In a unanimous opinion
written by Judge Wachtler, the Court held that the indelible right
to counsel attaches upon the filing of a .felony complaint. 29 The
Court observed that similar to an indictment, a felony complaint
constitutes a "formal accusation which the defendant must answer
in court" and marks the point at which the proceeding is no longer
merely- investigatory in nature. 30 It is therefore at this stage, em-
phasized Judge Wachtler, that the assistance of a lawyer becomes
critical.' 3 ' Since counsel generally enters the proceedings at ar-
raignment 32 and prompt arraignment is statutorily required sub-
123 Id. at 220, 400 N.E.2d at 1345, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 218, 220, 400 N.E.2d at 1345, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
127 Id. at 221, 400 N.E.2d at 1345, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
128 Id. at 223, 400 N.E.2d at 1347, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
129 Id. The defendant's argument that his right to counsel had attached when the fel-
ony complaint was filed against him was not raised until his appeal to the appellate division.
Id. at 221, 400 N.E.2d at 1345, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 894. His initial motion to suppress had been
based on other grounds. Id. at 220, 400 N.E.2d at 1345, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 893. The Court,
however, stated that this was not fatal to the defendant's appeal, invoking the "settled" rule
that the failure to raise a right-to-counsel issue at trial will not preclude its review on ap-
peal. Id. at 221, 400 N.E.2d at 1345, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 894 (citing People v. Dean, 47 N.Y.2d
967, 393 N.E.2d 1030, 419 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1979); People v. Ermo, 47 N.Y.2d 863, 392 N.E.2d
1248, 419 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1979); People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292
N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968)).
"20 49 N.Y.2d at 222, 400 N.E.2d at 1346, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 895; see People v. Settles, 46
N.Y.2d 154, 163, 385 N.E.2d 612, 616, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 879 (1978). While the Court admit-
ted that investigation may continue after a felony complaint is filed, it refused to accept the
prosecutor's argument that a complaint is merely an investigatory tool. 49 N.Y.2d at 222,
400 N.E.2d at 1346, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 895. Instead, the Court stressed that the purpose of an
arrest warrant issued on the basis of a felony complaint is to secure the defendant's pres-
ence at arraignment on the complaint. Id.
1 49 N.Y.2d at 222, 400 N.E.2d at 1346, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
122 CPL § 180.10(3) (1971), which codifies the right to counsel at arraignment, states:
The defendant has a right to the aid of counsel at the arraignment and at
every subsequent stage of the action, and, if he appears upon such arraignment
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sequent to an arrest based upon the filing of a felony complaint,133
the Samuels Court disregarded the intervening time period.
13 4
Thus, the Court concluded that, after the felony complaint had
been filed against him, the defendant could not have waived his
right to counsel in the absence of an attorney and that any state-
ments made by him without the assistance of a lawyer should have
been suppressed.1 3 5
Samuels is another illustration of the Court's continuing effort
to achieve parity between the rights of represented and unrepre-
sented defendants. 136 In People v. Settles,'3 7 the Court held that
an unrepresented defendant's right to counsel indelibly attached
upon the filing of an indictment. 13  The Settles Court relied heav-
ily on the statutory link between indictment and arraignment to
depart from the traditional view that an indelible right to counsel
without counsel, has the following rights:
(a) To an adjournment for the purpose of obtaining counsel; and
(b) To communicate, free of charge, by letter or by telephone, for the pur-
pose of obtaining counsel and informing a relative or friend that he has been
charged with an offense; and
(c) To have counsel assigned by the court in any case where he is financially
unable to obtain the same.
This link between arraignment and representation by counsel contributed to the tradi-
tional view that arraignment was the "first stage of a criminal proceeding." People v.
Stockford, 24 N.Y.2d 146, 149, 247 N.E.2d 141, 142-43, 299 N.Y.S.2d 172, 174 (1969)(quot-
ing People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 164, 182 N.E.2d 103, 104, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427, 428 (1962)).
'33 The CPL requires prompt arraignment following an arrest by warrant:
Upon arresting a defendant for any offense pursuant to a warrant of arrest
... or upon so arresting him for a felony ... a police officer ... must without
unnecessary delay bring the defendant before the local criminal court in which
such warrant is returnable.
CPL § 120.90(1)(1971).
The "warrant of arrest" used in § 120.90 is defined in § 120.10(1) as follows:
A warrant of arrest is a process issued by a local criminal court directing a
police officer to arrest a defendant designated in an accusatory instrument filed
with such court and to bring him before such court in connection with such instru-
ment. The sole function of a warrant of arrest is to achieve a defendant's court
appearance in a criminal action for the purpose of arraignment upon the accusa-
tory instrument by which such action was commenced.
CPL § 120.10(1)(1971).
131 49 N.Y.2d at 223, 400 N.E.2d at 1347, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 895; see People v. Settles, 46
N.Y.2d 154, 166, 385 N.E.2d 612, 618, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 881 (1978); notes 137-139 and ac-
companying text infra.
49 N.Y.2d at 223, 400 N.E.2d at 1347, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
See notes 97-100 and accompanying text supra.
17 46 N.Y.2d 154, 385 N.E.2d 612, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978).
8' Id. at 159, 385 N.E.2d at 614, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 876; see note 100 and accompanying
text supra.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:580
did not attach until the actual interjection of counsel into the pro-
ceedings at arraignment.' e In Samuels, the Court invoked a simi-
lar rationale to extend the indelible right to an unrepresented de-
fendant against whom a felony complaint had been filed.140 Since
the Criminal Procedure Law mandates that the filing of all accusa-
tory instruments be followed by prompt arraignment,14 1 it is sub-
mitted that this "statutory link" reasoning may provide the basis
for further expansion of the indelible right to counsel.
An undesirable effect of the Samuels decision may be an in-
crease in the number of warrantless arrests. Law enforcement per-
sonnel might eschew the use of the felony complaint as a means of
obtaining an arrest warrant in order to avoid restrictions on their
investigatory activity.14 2 Although a felony complaint must be filed
"without unnecessary delay" following a warrantless arrest, 43 it is
1"9 46 N.Y.2d at 166, 385 N.E.2d at 618, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 881. CPL § 210.10 (Pam. 1972-
1979) states in part: "After an indictment has been filed with a superior court, the defen-
dant must be arraigned thereon." The CPL also provides that a defendant is entitled to the
assistance of counsel at arraignment and at all subsequent stages of the proceeding. Id. §
210.15(2). At the arraignment, the defendant must be given the opportunity to retain an
attorney and the court must assign counsel for the indigent defendant upon request. Id. §
210.15(2)(c).
Since the CPL creates a right to counsel at arraignment and requires an indictment to
be followed by arraignment, the Settles Court concluded that:
[W]here. . . all that stands between the entry of counsel into the proceedings and
nonrepresentation is the ministerial act of arraignment, there may be no waiver of
the right to counsel unless an attorney is present. Thus, where an indictment has
been returned, we equate the indictment with the entry of a lawyer into the pro-
ceedings and invoke the requirement of counsel's presence to effectuate a valid
waiver.
46 N.Y.2d at 166, 385 N.E.2d at 618, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
140 See notes 132-134 and accompanying text supra.
The CPL does not expressly state that arraignment must follow the filing of a felony
complaint. CPL § 180.10 (1971) merely outlines the procedures a court must follow at an
"arraignment . . . upon a felony complaint." Id. But see Id. § 170.10(1) (Pam. 1972-1979);
note 141 infra. Apparently recognizing the seemingly unintended omission in the express
language of the statute, the Samuels Court relied upon the statute requiring prompt ar-
raignment following the issuance of an arrest warrant. See 49 N.Y.2d at 222, 400 N.E.2d at
1346, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 895; CPL § 120.90 (1)(1971).
It is suggested that since all other accusatory instruments must be followed by arraign-
ment, see CPL § 170.10(1)(Supp. Pam. 1972-1979); CPL § 210.10 (Pam. 1972-1979), the
same procedure was intended for felony complaints.
11 CPL § 170.10(1) (Pam. 1972-1979) states in part: "Following the filing with a local
criminal court of an information, a simplified information, a prosecutor's information or a
misdemeanor complaint, the defendant must be arraigned thereon." CPL § 210.10 (Pam.
1972-1979) imposes the same requirement when an indictment is filed.
1'2 See also People v. Stockford, 24 N.Y.2d 146, 149, 247 N.E.2d 141, 142, 299 N.Y.S.2d
172, 174 (1969).
143 CPL § 140.20(1) (1971) states in part:
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suggested that the police might attempt to use the intervening pe-
riod to question the defendant in the absence of an attorney.
144
People v. Rogers:145 Indelible right extends to an unrelated charge
The Taylor exception to the Donovan-Arthur rule generally
permitted custodial interrogation of a represented defendant in the
absence of his attorney provided the questioning was unrelated to
the charge for which he had secured counsel. 146 Recently, however,
Upon arresting a person without a warrant, a police officer, after performing
without unnecessary delay all recording, fingerprinting and other preliminary po-
lice duties required in the particular case, must except as otherwise provided in
this section, without unnecessary delay bring the arrested person or cause him to
be brought before a local criminal court and file therewith an appropriate accusa-
tory instrument charging him with the offense or offenses in question.
44 But cf. People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 340, 320 N.E.2d 625, 632, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881,
891 (1974) (undue delay between warrantless arrest and filing accusatory instrument "is
prima facie a suspect circumstance").
The possibility of increased warrantless arrests has been lessened by the United States
Supreme Court decision in Payton v. New York, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980). In Payton the Court
held that warrantless arrests made within a defendant's home violate the fourth amendment
in the absence of exigent circumstances.
145 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979).
"' See People v. Taylor, 27 N.Y.2d 327, 332, 266 N.E.2d 630, 633, 318 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5
(1971). In Taylor, the defendants had been assigned counsel and were being held on a rob-
bery charge. Id. at 329-30, 266 N.E.2d at 630, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 3. In the absence of their
attorney, the defendants were questioned about an unrelated murder and made incriminat-
ing statements. Id. at 329, 266 N.E.2d at 630-31, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 2. Appealing their convic-
tions on the murder charge, the defendants claimed that the statements should have been
suppressed since they were rendered in violation of their right to counsel. Id. at 330, 266
N.E.2d at 631, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 3. The Court, however, held that the statements were admis-
sible notwithstanding the prosecutor's knowledge that the defendants had been assigned
counsel on the robbery charge. Id. at 331-32, 266 N.E.2d at 632, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 4-5. The
Court declared that the Donovan-Arthur line of cases, see note 99 and accompanying text
supra, had no application "unless and until the police or prosecutor learn that an attorney
has been secured to assist the accused in defending against the specific charges for which
he is held." Id. at 332, 266 N.E.2d at 633, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 5 (emphasis in original); see
People v. Hetherington, 27 N.Y.2d 242, 245, 265 N.E.2d 530, 531, 317 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2-3 (1970);
People v. Stanley, 15 N.Y.2d 30, 32-33, 203 N.E.2d 475, 477, 255 N.Y.S.2d 74, 76 (1964).
The validity of the Taylor exception often has been reacknowledged by the Court of
Appeals. E.g., People v. Clark, 41 N.Y.2d 612, 363 N.E.2d 319, 394 N.Y.S.2d 593, cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 864 (1977); People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 483, 348 N.E.2d 894, 897, 384
N.Y.S.2d 419, 422 (1976); cf. People v. Coleman, 43 N.Y.2d 222, 371 N.E.2d 819, 401
N.Y.S.2d 57 (1977) (represented defendant has no indelible right to counsel at lineup on
unrelated charge). The Taylor rule was subject to three major exceptions: first, when the
charge for which the defendant had a right to counsel was a sham or pretext to enable the
police to question the defendant on another matter, People v. Taylor, 27 N.Y.2d at 331, 266
N.E.2d at 632, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 4; People v. Jackson, 22 N.Y.2d 446, 451, 239 N.E.2d 869,
871-72, 293 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269 (1968); see People v. Vella, 21 N.Y.2d 249, 234 N.E.2d 422,
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in People v. Rogers,17 the Court of Appeals nullified this excep-
tion, holding that unless his attorney is present, a represented de-
fendant in custody may not be interrogated by the police on any
matter.
4 8
In Rogers, the defendant was arrested as a suspect in a rob-
bery and taken to a police station for questioning. 4 9 Rogers stated
that he had an attorney but nevertheless agreed to speak to the
police in the absence of his lawyer. 150 After a 2-hour interrogation,
his attorney contacted the police and directed them to discontinue
questioning the defendant.' 5' Although the police ceased question-
ing the defendant on the robbery charge, they continued to inter-
rogate him for an additional 4 hours on an unrelated matter. 52 Af-
ter the interrogation had terminated,15  a detective heard Rogers
utter an inculpatory statement.15 4 The defendant was tried and
convicted of robbery in the first degree following an unsuccessful
motion to suppress the statement. 55 The Appellate Division, Sec-
ond Department, affirmed the conviction.5
A divided Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the state-
ment should have been suppressed as the product of an illegal cus-
todial interrogation. 157  Writing for the majority, Chief Judge
Cooke55 emphasized the high degree of protection afforded a de-
287 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1967), when, in bad faith, the police disregard an attorney's specific in-
struction not to question the defendant on any matter, thereby indicating the representa-
tion extended to the unrelated charge, People v. Ramos, 40 N.Y.2d 610, 616, 357 N.E.2d 955,
959, 389 N.Y.S.2d 299, 303 (1976), and when the police exploit impermissible interrogation
concerning a valid charge for which the defendant has a right to counsel in order to advance
their investigation of the unrelated charge, People v. Ermo, 47 N.Y.2d 863, 865, 392 N.E.2d
1248, 1249-50, 419 N.Y.S.2d 65, 66 (1979), af'g 61 App. Div. 2d 177, 181-82, 401 N.Y.S.2d
831, 832 (2d Dep't 1978).
17 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979).
18 Id. at 173, 397 N.E.2d at 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
"' Id. at 170, 397 N.E.2d at 711, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 19. The defendant was handcuffed,
given Miranda warnings, and taken to the police station where he again received Miranda
warnings. Id.
-8 Id. at 170, 397 N.E.2d at 711, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 19-20.
1:81 Id. at 170, 397 N.E.2d at 711, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
182 Id.
188 Id. The interrogation had lasted approximately 4 hours; during the entire time, the
defendant had been handcuffed. Id.
184 Id.
'55 Id. The motion to suppress the statement was denied on the ground that the state-
ment was spontaneously volunteered. Id. But see note 160 infra.
188 63 App. Div. 2d 867, 404 N.Y.S.2d 935 (2d Dep't 1978)(mem.).
17 48 N.Y.2d at 169, 397 N.E.2d at 710-11, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
18 Chief Judge Cooke was joined in the majority by Judges Jones, Wachtler, Fuchs-
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fendant's right to counsel in New York159 and stated that the Tay-
lor exception had been devised when the Donovan-Arthur rule was
in doubt. °10 Noting the reaffirmance of the Donovan-Arthur line of
cases1 61 and the significant restriction of the scope of the Taylor
exception,. 62 the Rogers majority declared Taylor incompatible
with present right to counsel guarantees.63 Additionally, the Court
observed that most attorneys would seek to safeguard the rights of
their clients even in matters unrelated to the subject of their initial
retainer or appointment and that it is for the lawyer, not the state,
to evaluate the connection between the questioning and the
charge.6 4 Thus, the Court held that custodial interrogation, on any
topic, of a represented defendant outside the presence of his attor-
ney is unlawful. 65
berg, and Meyer. Judge Jasen dissented in an opinion in which Judge Gabrielli concurred.
159 48 N.Y.2d at 170, 397 N.E.2d at 711, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 20. See generally notes 97-100
and accompanying text supra.
"10 48 N.Y.2d at 171, 397 N.E.2d at 712, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 20. See generally People v.
Robles, 27 N.Y.2d 155, 263 N.E.2d 304, 314 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945
(1971).
161 48 N.Y.2d at 171, 397 N.E.2d at 712, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 20 (citing People v. Hobson, 39
N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976)); see note 99 supra.
162 48 N.Y.2d at 171-72, 397 N.E.2d at 712, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 20-21.
163 Id. at 173, 397 N.E.2d at 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
164 Id.
165 Id. Rather than according the defendant an unnecessary advantage, the Court
stated that "the attorney's presence serves to equalize the positions of the accused and the
sovereign, mitigating the coercive influence of the State and rendering it less overwhelm-
ing." Id.; see note 97 and accompanying text supra.
Noting that the defendant had uttered the statement after 6 hours of questioning and
that throughout the interrogation he had been "manacled to furniture," the Court also de-
termined that the statement did not fall within the spontaneous declaration exception to
the Donovan-Arthur rule. 48 N.Y.2d at 174, 397 N.E.2d at 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 22. See
generally People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 483, 348 N.E.2d 894, 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421
(1976); note 99 supra. Rather, the Court characterized the utterance as the result of the
"psychologically coercive influence of the police tactics." 48 N.Y.2d at 174, 397 N.E.2d at
714, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 22. Under the rule of People v. Kaye, 25 N.Y.2d 139, 250 N.E.2d 329,
303 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1969), a spontaneously volunteered statement made by a defendant, not
elicited by questions, is admissible notwithstanding that the statement otherwise would be
inadmissible. Id. at 144-45, 250 N.E.2d at 332, 303 N.Y.S.2d. at 46. The Kaye Court relied
upon Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), wherein the Court stated, "[v]olunteered
statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is
not affected by our holding." Id. at 478; see 25 N.Y.2d at 144, 250 N.E.2d at 331, 303
N.Y.S.2d at 45. For a statement to qualify, "the spontaneity has to be genuine and not the
result of inducement, provocation, encouragement or acquiescence, no matter how subtly
employed." People v. Maerling, 46 N.Y.2d 289, 302-03, 385 N.E.2d 1245, 1253, 413 N.Y.S.2d
316, 324 (1978). The spontaneous declaration exception has been interpreted to authorize
the admission of spontaneous statements uttered while in custody but prior to the receipt of
Miranda warnings, People v. Bostic, 97 Misc. 2d 1039, 1045, 412 N.Y.S.2d 948, 952 (Dist. Ct.
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Dissenting, Judge Jasen asserted that there was no inconsis-
tency between Taylor and the Donovan-Arthur right to counsel.1 16
The dissent maintained that no impingement on a defendant's
rights would result from interrogation on an unrelated charge pre-
ceding the commencement of formal proceedings concerning that
charge. 1 7 Judge Jasen also noted that the Taylor rule imposes no
obligation on the suspect to answer.1 68 Finally, the dissent opined
that the majority's holding will have a devastating effect upon law
enforcement, since it prohibits the questioning of mere witnesses
who are represented by counsel in some other criminal matter un-
less their attorney is present. 169
Although an attorney had actually entered the proceedings in
Rogers,170 it is suggested that the Court's holding could apply with
equal force to those actions where the defendant's indelible right
to counsel has been triggered by the filing of an indictment1 1 or a
felony complaint.'72 The court has required the suppression of
Nassau County 1978), after the attachment of the Donovan-Arthur right to counsel, People
v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 483, 348 N.E.2d 894, 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 422 (1976), after
arraignment, People v. Lynes, 49 N.Y.2d 286, 401 N.E.2d 405, 425 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1980), and
after a defendant's request for an attorney has triggered his indelible right to counsel, Peo-
ple v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 210 n.2, 400 N.E.2d 360, 365 n.2, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 425
n.2 (1980).
Significantly, the Rogers Court noted that while "[m]ere custody exerts some coercive
influence on a suspect, . . . generally, such influence alone will not form the predicate for
finding a statement nonspontaneous as a matter of law." 48 N.Y.2d at 174, 397 N.E.2d at
714, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
106 48 N.Y.2d at 175-76, 397 N.E.2d at 714-15, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 23 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting).
167 Id. at 176, 397 N.E.2d at 715, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 24 (Jasen, J., dissenting); see People
v. Stanley, 15 N.Y.2d 30, 32-33, 203 N.E.2d 475, 477, 255 N.Y.S.2d 74, 76 (1964); note 120
supra.
:68 48 N.Y.2d at 176, 397 N.E.2d at 715, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 24 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
1 8 Id. Judge Jasen argued that, alternatively, the defendant's statement should have
been admitted under the spontaneous statement exception to the Donovan-Arthur rule. Id.
at 177-78, 397 N.E.2d 715-16, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 24-25 (Jasen, J., dissenting); see note 165
supra. Judge Jasen noted that the spontaneity issue is one of fact and that the trial court's
conclusion that the defendant's statement was spontaneous was affirmed by the appellate
division. 48 N.Y.2d at 177, 397 N.E.2d at 716, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 24-25 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
Maintaining that the record supported this determination, the dissent declared that the
majority had exceeded the scope of its authority to review questions of fact. Id. at 177-78,
397 N.E.2d at 716, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 25 (Jasen, J., dissenting); see People v. Wharton, 46
N.Y.2d 924, 388 N.E.2d 341, 415 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1979).
170 48 N.Y.2d at 170, 397 N.E.2d at 711, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 20; see note 99 and accompa-
nying text supra.
171 See generally People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 385 N.E.2d 612, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874
(1978); note 100 and accompanying text supra.
12 See generally People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218, 400 N.E.2d 1344, 424 N.Y.S.2d 892
1980] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
statements made by a defendant outside the presence of counsel
after the filing of either of these accusatory instruments based on
the rationale that the filing of these documents is equivalent to the
entry of an attorney into the proceeding' 7 -the point at which the
indelible right to counsel attaches.17 4 The Rogers Court expressly
stated that right-to-counsel protection for both related and unre-
lated charges arises "once an attorney has entered the proceed-
ing. '17 5 It is submitted, therefore, that in the future, statements
concerning an unrelated charge, elicited from either an indicted
defendant or one against whom a felony complaint has been filed,
might also be held inadmissible if made while in custody without
the assistance of counsel.176
Nevertheless, it is submitted that good faith questioning about
a separate matter by investigators ignorant of the defendant's
prior retention or assignment of counsel should not trigger the
Rogers rule.1 77 Although police exploitation of the unrelated charge
(1980); notes 122-144 and accompanying text supra.
173 People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d at 218, 400 N.E.2d at 1344, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421
(1980); People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d at 166, 385 N.E.2d at 618, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 881. See
notes 137-140 pnd accompanying text supra.
174 See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
175 48 N.Y.2d at 169, 397 N.E.2d at 710, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
'v Indeed, it is conceivable that the Rogers rule might also be extended to situations
where the right to counsel has been triggered by a defendant's request for counsel. See
generally People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 400 N.E.2d 360, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1980);
notes 101-121 and accompanying text supra. If counsel is considered "in the proceeding"
once the defendant has invoked his right to the assistance of a lawyer, there would appear
to be no reason not to extend the "representation" to any criminal matter.
7 See People v. Clark, 41 N.Y.2d 612, 615, 363 N.E.2d 319, 321, 394 N.Y.S.2d 593, 596,
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 864 (1977). The Clark Court stated:
[Tihe presence of counsel [does not] immunize the defendant from normal, good
faith, investigation which occurs after indictment and is unrelated thereto and
directed toward other criminal activity ....
The prohibition against custodial interrogation after a lawyer has entered the
proceedings absent the presence of counsel or a waiver, is aimed at protecting a
defendant from deliberate effots (sic) by law enforcement officials to elicit incrimi-
nating statements in disregard of constitutional protections. However, where the
police are engaged in no such deliberate attempt but are instead pursuing a good
faith investigation, neither the need nor the purpose for the rule is furthered by
its application.
Id. (citations omitted). Rogers makes but one oblique reference to Clark, 48 N.Y.2d at 172,
397 N.E.2d at 714, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 23, and is silent on the issue of good faith. The Clark
case has spawned several lower court decisions that have allowed a defendant's incriminat-
ing statements to be used against the defendant based on the Clark test of good faith,
rather than on the basis of the Taylor rule. See, e.g., People v. Schwimmer, 99 Misc. 2d 980,
417 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979). See also People v. Rolston, 66 App. Div. 2d
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exception well may have prompted the Rogers Court to abrogate it
entirely,"'8 a provident solution would be to limit the availability
of the Taylor exception to those instances where the police did not
know, nor could be deemed to have known, that the defendant was
represented by an attorney.179
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the Cunningham, Samuels, and Rogers
decisions presage more significant developments in the right-to-
counsel area. The cases seem to portend an effort by the Court to
eliminate totally any disparity remaining between the right-to-
counsel protections afforded the represented defendant and those
enjoyed by the unrepresented defendant. It is suggested that the
logical terminus of this process would be to hold that the indelible
right to counsel attaches at custodial interrogation.1 80 By so doing,
the Court would necessarily supplant the complex notion of the
right to counsel as it exists today with a simple and unified stan-
dard. Questions whether the "critical stage"' 81 has been reached, or
whether an attorney has entered the proceeding, 82 or whether an
617, 414 N.Y.S.2d 342 (2d Dep't 1979); People v. Boyd, 94 Misc. 2d 1074, 406 N.Y.S.2d 963
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1978). Whether Clark will survive Rogers, however, remains
uncertain.
178 In Rogers, the police were fully aware that the defendant had an attorney. See note
150 and accompanying text supra. See also People v. Ermo, 47 N.Y.2d 863, 865, 392 N.E.2d
1248, 1249, 419 N.Y.S.2d 65, 66, af'g 61 App. Div. 2d 177, 181-82, 401 N.Y.S.2d 831, 832 (2d
Dep't 1978).
"I See generally People v. Ermo, 47 N.Y.2d 863, 392 N.E.2d 1248, 419 N.Y.S.2d 65
(1979); People v. Coleman, 43 N.Y.2d 222, 371 N.E.2d 819, 401 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1977); People v.
Ramos, 40 N.Y.2d 610, 357 N.E.2d 955, 389 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1976); People v. Hobson, 39
N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976); People v. Vella, 21 N.Y.2d 249, 234
N.E.2d 422, 287 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1967).
180 The right to counsel does not apply when the defendant is not in custody. People v.
Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 483, 348 N.E.2d 894, 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 422 (1976); see note 99
supra. Nor must Miranda warnings be given unless the defendant is in custody. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 477 (1966).
In perhaps a prophetic statement, Judge Van Voorhis commented in People v. Dono-
van, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963): "The inevitable result of this
doctrine, if it [is] to be maintained, is to require the police to summon a lawyer before
questioning an accused." Id. at 162, 193 N.E.2d at 636, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 852 (Van Voorhis,
J., dissenting).
I" See People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 165, 385 N.E.2d 612, 618, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874,
881 (1978); People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 339-40, 320 N.E.2d 625, 632, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881,
890-91 (1974); note 100 supra.
182 See People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 481, 348 N.E.2d 894, 896, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419,
420 (1976); People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 329, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663,
666 (1968); note 99 and accompanying text supra.
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affirmative request for counsel had been made,"'3 would be ren-
dered largely irrelevant.
The wisdom of such an extension of the indelible right to
counsel, however, is open to serious question. The spectre of "sta-
tion house lawyers"184 and the concomitant debilitating effect on
interrogation as an investigative method compel the conclusion
that any further extension would be ill-considered and unneces-
sary.185 In any event, should the Court ultimately adopt a rule at-
taching the indelible right to counsel at custodial interrogation, a
strong impetus may thereby be provided to narrow the broad defi-
nition of custody currently adhered to by the courts.8 6 For exam-
183 See People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 205, 400 N.E.2d 360, 361, 424 N.Y.S.2d
421, 422 (1980); notes 101-121 and accompanying text supra.
181 In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court stated that its holding did not
"mean, . . . that each police station must have a 'station house lawyer' present at all times
to advise prisoners." Id. at 474.
18 When counsel enters the proceeding, he normally advises his client to remain silent
and not to submit to interrogation. Thus, the court's recent expansion of the indelible right
to counsel, to say nothing of further expansion, inevitably will work seriously to limit inter-
rogation as an investigative tool. Commentators have noted that interrogation is the most
frequently employed method of investigation. See F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGA-
TION AND CONFESSIONS 1 (1962). Moreover, many crimes, by their nature, can be solved only
by confession. Id. at 204. Professor Inbau has commented:
As a matter of fact, the act of criminal investigation has not developed to a point
where the search for and the examination of physical evidence will always, or even
in most cases, reveal a clue to the identity of the perpetrator or provide the neces-
sary proof of his guilt. In criminal investigations, even of the most efficient type,
there are many, many instances where physical clues are entirely absent, and the
only approach to a possible solution of the crime is the interrogation of the crimi-
nal suspect himself ....
Inbau, Police Interrogation-A Practical Necessity, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 16, 16 (1961).
See Parker, A Lawman's Lament, 40 L.A. BAR BULL. 603, 642 (1965). See also Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 160 (1943)(Jackson, J., dissenting).
Moreover, extension of the indelible right to counsel to the stage at which constitutional
warnings must be given would be, in effect, a statement by the Court that no one can make
an informed and volunteered choice to speak with the authorities. In reality, as the majority
in People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 385 N.E.2d 612, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978), noted: "Prior
to indictment, there may be valid reasons why an uncounseled suspect might wish to deal
with the police." Id. at 163, 385 N.E.2d at 616, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 879. The defendant falsely
or precipitously arrested might seek to clarify the error quickly. In the alternative, a crimi-
nal suspect "may feel that by getting into the good graces of the police as an informer he
might be able to avoid indictment and trial." Id. It is submitted, therefore, that a further
broadening of the indelible right to counsel will interfere significantly with the criminal
process, causing perhaps insurmountable difficulties for both law enforcement authorities
and criminal suspects.
186 In New York, a defendant is deemed "in custody" if his freedom is restricted in a
significant way, or if a reasonable man, innocent of any wrongdoing, would have thought his
freedom was so restricted. People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, 256 N.E.2d 172, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857
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ple, an inculpatory statement elicited at a brief street encounter
after Miranda warnings have been given may well require suppres-
sion under such an expanded right-to-counsel rule. Thus, to miti-
gate the severe limitation that the rule would impose on police in-




(1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851 (1970); People v. Rodney P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 255,
286 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1967); see People v. Liccione, 63 App. Div. 2d 305, 407 N.Y.S.2d 753 (4th
Dep't 1978). It has been held that a street encounter between the police and a suspect may
be deemed a7 custodial interrogation. See People v. Shivers, 21 N.Y.2d 118, 233 N.E.2d 836,
286 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1967); People v. Johnson, 64 App. Div. 2d 907, 408 N.Y.S.2d 519 (2d
Dep't 1978). In Shivers, the police, with guns drawn, stopped and questioned a suspect who
fit the description of the perpetrator of a robbery. The suspect made false exculpatory state-
ments when asked his name and prior whereabouts. The Court suppressed the statements,
holding that the questioning of a suspect at gunpoint sufficiently deprives the suspect of his
freedom and renders any statement made before the Miranda warnings are given inadmissi-
ble in evidence. 21 N.Y.2d at 122, 233 N.E.2d at 839, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 830. The Court, how-
ever, has formulated an exception to the Shivers rule in order to provide law enforcement
officials with a reasonable opportunity to investigate criminal conduct. In People v.
Huffman, 41 N.Y.2d 29, 359 N.E.2d 353, 390 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1976), the Court held that a
police officer could question persons without first administering Miranda warnings if he was
attempting to "clarify" suspicious behavior to determine whether criminal conduct had oc-
curred. Id. at 34, 359 N.E.2d at 356-57, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 846-47. The Huffman Court distin-
guished Shivers on the ground that Shivers concerned questioning a defendant about a
crime that the police knew had occurred. Id. See People v. Greer, 42 N.Y.2d 170, 366 N.E.2d
273, 397 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1977).
The New York approach differs from the definition of custody adhered to by the United
States Supreme Court, which apparently makes no allowance for a reasonable man's belief
in determining whether an accused is in custody. In United States v. Washington, 431 U.S.
181 (1977), the Court stated that custody involves a " 'genuine compulsion of testimony' ".
Id. at 187 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974)). In Oregon v. Mathiason,
429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam), a parolee, who had complied with a telephoned request to
visit the police station, was placed in a closed room for one-half hour afterbeing told he was
a suspect. The Court found that the parolee had not been in custody. Id. at 495. Addition-
ally, street questioning of an accused generally is not considered custodial under the federal
approach. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48 (1976); United States v. Mes-
sina, 388 F.2d 393 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1026 (1968); Spritzer, Criminal Waiver,
Procedural Default And The Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 473, 482 n.43 (1978). An
accused has been deemed in custody, however, where he previously had been arrested and
no longer was free to go where he pleased, notwithstanding that he was interrogated in his
own home. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
